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Abstract
Collective actions, from city marathons to labor strikes, are often mass-driven and subject to the snowball effect. Motivated
by this, we study evolutionary advantages of conditional punishment in the spatial public goods game. Unlike unconditional
punishers who always impose the same fines on defectors, conditional punishers do so proportionally with the number of other
punishers in the group. Phase diagrams in dependence on the punishment fine and cost reveal that the two types of punishers
cannot coexist. Spontaneous coarsening of the two strategies leads to an indirect territorial competition with the defectors, which
is won by unconditional punishers only if the sanctioning is inexpensive. Otherwise conditional punishers are the victors of the
indirect competition, indicating that under more realistic conditions they are indeed the more effective strategy. Both continuous
and discontinuous phase transitions as well as tricritical points characterize the complex evolutionary dynamics, which is due to
multipoint interactions that are introduced by conditional punishment. We propose indirect territorial competition as a generally
applicable mechanism relying on pattern formation, by means of which spatial structure can be utilized by seemingly subordinate
strategies to avoid evolutionary extinction.
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1. Introduction
Adherence to law in human societies is maintained by sanc-
tioning. If the law has been broken retribution will follow. The
looming threat of punishment should thus avert us from engag-
ing into illegal activities. Positive incentives for adhering to the
law are much less common and restricted mainly to motivating
past offenders to stay on the right path. The evolutionary ori-
gins of this are difficult to determine. Our other-regarding abil-
ities are believed to have been ignited by challenges in rearing
offspring that survived (Hrdy, 2011), although there is also ev-
idence suggesting that between-group conflicts may have been
instrumental too (Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Both options are
viable and suggest that members of human societies were ini-
tially more prone to adherence than they were to disobedience
and disregard of expected behavioral patterns. Punishment may
therefore have emerged spontaneously as a way of treating the
minority that misbehaved. It would have been much more te-
dious and taxing to reward all those that behaved properly. And
this might have eventually led to the evolution of the legal sys-
tem that is in place today, rather than to the evolution of a large-
scale rewarding system.
Although to cooperate is certainly not the same as ad-
hering to the law, in the light of preceding arguments it
may nevertheless be little surprising that punishment, much
more so than rewarding, would be considered as the pre-
ferred method of choice for averting the threatening “tragedy
of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). Past research has in
fact focused more on punishment than reward for promoting
and maintaining public cooperation (Clutton-Brock and Parker,
1995; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003;
Semmann et al., 2003; de Quervain et al., 2004; Fowler, 2005a;
Hauert et al., 2007; Ga¨chter et al., 2008; Ohtsuki et al., 2009;
Rockenbach and Milinski, 2009), with the general conclusion
being that sanctioning is indeed more effective (Sigmund et al.,
2001; Sigmund, 2007). Only recently, the efficiency of punish-
ment has been brought into questioning. Rewarding appears
to offer evolutionary advantages that go beyond those war-
ranted by punishment (Dreber et al., 2008; Rand et al., 2009;
Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010; Szolnoki and Perc, 2010; Hauert,
2010; Szolnoki and Perc, 2012b), while the introduction of
antisocial punishment might render the concept of sanction-
ing altogether ineffective (Herrmann et al., 2008; Rand et al.,
2010; Rand and Nowak, 2011; Garcı´a and Traulsen, 2012;
Hilbe and Traulsen, 2012). Although it is beyond the scope
of the present work to discuss the potential relevance and
feasibility of these strategic choices, the continued appeal
of punishment as a means to promote public cooperation,
as evidenced by recent studies on institutionalized punish-
ment (Sigmund et al., 2010; Szolnoki et al., 2011; Perc, 2012;
Traulsen et al., 2012), the coevolution and self-organization
of punishment (Boyd et al., 2010; Perc and Szolnoki, 2012),
as well as its many variants (Mathew and Boyd, 2011;
Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011; Sasaki et al., 2012), ought to
attest to its lasting effectiveness and thus lend support to further
explorations to that effect.
With this in mind, we here study potential evolutionary ad-
vantages of conditional punishment in the spatial public goods
game (Wakano et al., 2009; Szolnoki et al., 2009). It is clear
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that spatial structure plays a pivotal role by the evolution of
cooperation, as comprehensively reviewed in (Szabo´ and Fa´th,
2007; Roca et al., 2009; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010). Although
recent large-scale human experiments indicate otherwise
(Gracia-La´zaro et al., 2012a,b), there is ample theoretical evi-
dence indicating that relaxing the simplification of well-mixed
interactions may lead to qualitatively different results that
are due to pattern formation and intricate organization of the
competing strategies, which reveals itself in most unexpected
ways (Szolnoki et al., 2012a). The seminal paper introducing
games on grids is due to Nowak and May (Nowak and May,
1992), while recent works concerning the spatial public goods
game have considered the relevance of complex interac-
tion networks and coevolution (Lozano et al., 2008; Wu et al.,
2009a,b; Go´mez-Garden˜es et al., 2011a,b; Pen˜a and Rochat,
2012), diversity (Santos et al., 2008; Fort, 2008; Wang et al.,
2010; Santos et al., 2012), the risk of collective failures
(Santos and Pacheco, 2011; Chen et al., 2012), the appropriate
partner and opponent selection (Wu et al., 2009b; Zhang et al.,
2011; Brede, 2012), the population density (Wang et al.,
2012), conditional cooperation (Szolnoki and Perc, 2012a),
heterogeneous wealth distributions (Wang et al., 2010), di-
rected investments (Vukov et al., 2011), selection pressure
(Van Segbroeck et al., 2011; Pinheiro et al., 2012), as well as
both the joker (Arenas et al., 2011; Requejo et al., 2012) and
the Matthew effect (Perc, 2011), to name but a few.
The relevance of structured populations for the success
of punishment is also thoroughly documented (Brandt et al.,
2003; Nakamaru and Iwasa, 2005; Helbing et al., 2010a;
Szolnoki et al., 2011; Perc and Szolnoki, 2012). Since the
number of competing strategies can be three (Hauert et al.,
2002; Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Brandt and Sigmund,
2005; Helbing et al., 2010b), four (Sigmund et al., 2001;
Ohtsuki et al., 2009), or even higher (Henrich and Boyd, 2001;
Dreber et al., 2008; Rand et al., 2010), besides traditional
cooperators and defectors taking into account also all the
different forms of punishment, the simulations of spatial
systems ought to be done with a lot of caution. If imitation
governs the evolutionary process, which is certainly a rea-
sonable assumption given that it has a positive impact even
at weak selection pressure (Masuda, 2012; Mobilia, 2012;
Szolnoki et al., 2012b), possible stable solutions of the whole
system are all the solutions of each subsystem, comprising only
a subset of all the original strategies (Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007).
The most stable solution can only be determined by performing
a systematic check of the direction of invasion between all
possible pairs of subsystem solutions that are separated by
an interface in the spatial system. Of course many of the
subsystem solutions will not be stable, and along several of the
interfaces the victor will be obvious, which may significantly
reduce the complexity of the problem. Nevertheless, the belief
that simulations of spatial games are subject to no restrictions
in terms of the number of competing strategies is wrong and
should not be perpetuated based on the few rare exceptions that
considered prohibitively high numbers of competing strategies
in spatial games but did not take properly into account the
limitation and pitfalls, including accidental extinctions due to
insufficiently large system size.
Here we consider four competing strategies on a square lat-
tice. Cooperators, who contribute to the public good but ab-
stain from punishing defectors are the second-order free-riders,
and they can seriously challenge the success of sanctioning
(Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Fowler, 2005b). Defectors nei-
ther contribute to the public good nor to sanctioning. Notably,
the impact of double moral behavior, i.e., defectors who pun-
ish other defectors, has been studied before in (Helbing et al.,
2010a). Finally, we have conditional and unconditional punish-
ers, who both contribute to the public good as well as to punish-
ing defectors. However, while unconditional punishers always
impose the maximal fine on defectors, conditional punishers
fine defectors proportionally to the number of other punishers,
either conditional or unconditional, in the group. Importantly,
the cost of punishment that the punishers have to bear is always
proportional with the imposed fine, so that the ratio between the
fine and the cost is the same for both types of punishment. It can
be argued that conditional punishers act according to the “ma-
jority driven” principle, which has in fact been confirmed exper-
imentally for the severity of punishment in a public goods game
setting (Kodaka et al., 2012). Compared to the three-strategy
game entailing only cooperators, defectors and unconditional
punishers (Helbing et al., 2010b), we will show that the intro-
duction of conditional punishers lowers the minimally required
fine that is needed for cooperation to grab hold in the popula-
tion, and that in the more relevant parameter space where the
cost of sanctioning is comparable to the imposed fines, the con-
ditional way of punishing is in fact more effective. Moreover,
we will show that the indirect territorial competition reported
first in (Helbing et al., 2010a) can be observed also for other
strategy pairs, and that in general it is responsible for discon-
tinuous phase transitions between stable solutions of the game.
We will extend and explain these results in detail in Section III,
while now we proceed with a detailed description of the studied
spatial public goods game with conditional punishment.
2. Spatial public goods game with conditional punishment
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice with pe-
riodic boundary conditions where L2 players are arranged into
overlapping groups of size G = 5 such that everyone is con-
nected to its k = G−1 nearest neighbors. Accordingly, each in-
dividual belongs to g = 1, . . . ,G different groups. Initially each
player on site x is designated either as a cooperator (sx = C),
defector (sx = D), conditional punisher (sx = Pc), or uncondi-
tional punisher (sx = Pu) with equal probability. Except defec-
tors, all three other strategies contribute a fixed amount, here
considered being equal to 1 without loss of generality, to the
public good. The sum of all contributions in each group is mul-
tiplied by the synergy factor r and the resulting public goods are
distributed equally amongst all the group members irrespective
of their contributions.
Punishment is taken into account as follows. Cooperators
do not participate in the sanctioning of defectors, and hence
become the second-order free-riders (Panchanathan and Boyd,
2004; Fowler, 2005b). An unconditional punisher imposes the
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fine β/(G − 1) on each defector within the group, and bears the
related punishment cost γ/(G − 1), regardless of the presence
of other strategies. According to this parametrization, a single
defector is punished by the total fine β in a homogeneous group
of unconditional punishers. Conditional punishers, on the other
hand, impose a fine and carry the cost that is proportional to
the number of other punishers, either conditional or uncondi-
tional, within the group. For example, if a conditional punisher
is surrounded solely by other defectors and pure cooperators,
the fine imposed on each defector will be just 1/(G − 1) of the
maximal value. Importantly, the ratio between the imposed fine
and the related cost is always the same, which is essential be-
cause otherwise the efficiency of unconditional and conditional
punishment cannot be properly compared. Designating then the
number of cooperators, defectors, conditional punishers and un-
conditional punishers within the group g as NC , ND, NPc and
NPu , respectively, the payoffs of the four strategies stemming
from this particular group g are:
pi
g
C = r
NC + NPc + NPu
G
− 1, (1)
pi
g
D = r
NC + NPc + NPu
G
−NPc
(NPc + NPu )β
(G − 1)2 −NPu
β
G − 1
, (2)
pi
g
Pu = r
NC + NPc + NPu
G
− 1 − ND
γ
G − 1
, (3)
pi
g
Pc = r
NC + NPc + NPu
G
− 1 − ND
(NPc + NPu )γ
(G − 1)2 . (4)
Notably, the first subtraction in Eq. 2, which determines the
payoff of defectors, is due to conditional punishment, while the
second one is due to unconditional punishment. The punishers
bear the additional costs accordingly, as described by the last
terms in Eqs. 3 and 4. It is also worth emphasizing that con-
ditional punishment introduces multi-point interactions in that
the fine imposed on defectors as well as the related additional
costs of conditional punishers cannot be derived simply from
straightforward two-player interactions. Note that the fine im-
posed by player A onto player B depends not just on the strate-
gies of these two players, but also on the strategies of other
players within the group.
Monte Carlo simulations of the game are carried out com-
prising the following elementary steps. A randomly selected
player x plays the public goods game with its k partners as
a member of all the g groups, whereby its overall payoff pisx
is thus the sum of all the payoffs acquired in the five groups.
Next, player x chooses one of its nearest neighbors at ran-
dom, and the chosen co-player y also acquires its payoff pisy in
the same way. Finally, player x enforces its strategy sx onto
player y with a probability q = 1/{1 + exp[(pisy − pisx)/K]},
where K = 0.5 quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions
(Szolnoki et al., 2009), implying that better performing play-
ers are readily adopted, although it is not impossible to adopt
the strategy of a player performing worse. Such errors in de-
cision making can be attributed to mistakes and external influ-
ences that adversely affect the evaluation of the opponent. Each
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Figure 1: Phase diagram, depicting the strategies (C - cooperators, D - defec-
tors, Pc - conditional punishers, Pu - unconditional punishers) that remain on
the square lattice in the stationary state at r = 3.8, in dependence on the punish-
ment fine β and cost γ. Red dashed lines denote first-order discontinuous phase
transitions, while solid blue lines denote second-order continuous phase transi-
tions. At high fines Pc and Pu become neutral after cooperators and defectors
die out (see main text for details).
Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance for every player to en-
force its strategy onto one of the neighbors once on average.
The average densities of the four strategies were determined
in the stationary state after sufficiently long relaxation times.
Depending on the actual conditions, such as the proximity to
phase transition points and the typical size of emerging spatial
patterns, the linear system size was varied from L = 400 to
3200 and the relaxation time was varied from 105 to 107 MCS
to ensure proper accuracy. In general, the application of larger
system size was necessary to determine the accurate location of
discontinuous phase transitions.
3. Results
For the classical two-strategy spatial public goods game that
is contested solely between cooperators and defectors, there ex-
ists a critical value of r above which cooperation is no longer
possible. On the square lattice with overlapping groups con-
taining five players each, the critical value is equal to r = 3.74
at the applied value of K (Szolnoki et al., 2009). Accordingly,
it is of interest to investigate the impact of punishment above
and below this threshold, as the presence of cooperators, which
actually become the second-order free-riders because they ab-
stain from punishing defectors (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004;
Fowler, 2005b), is likely to affect the evolutionary outcome.
We begin by setting r = 3.8, where cooperators alone are
able to survive in the presence of defectors, and determine the
survivability of the four competing strategies in dependence on
the punishment fine β and cost γ. The full β − γ phase diagram
is presented in Fig. 1. It can be observed that the mixed D + C
phase dominates if only the ratio between the punishment cost
and fine is sufficiently high. As soon as β exceeds a threshold,
the mixed D+C phase gives way to a mixed D+Pc phase via a
3
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Figure 2: Representative cross-sections of the phase diagram presented in Fig. 1. Depicted are the stationary densities of the four competing strategies (see legend)
in dependence on the punishment fine β, as obtained for three different values of cost: γ = 0.3 (left), γ = 0.45 (middle), and γ = 0.6 (right).
first-order discontinuous phase transition. Naturally, the higher
the cost of punishment, the larger the value of β that is needed
to evoke this transition. If we compare this phase diagram with
the one obtained for the three-strategy public goods game that
does not contain conditional punishers (Helbing et al., 2010b),
we find that in the present case the phase transition line that de-
lineates the punishment-free state is actually shifted to smaller
fines. In other words, conditional punishers can subvert second-
order free-riders even under less friendly conditions, i.e., when
the punishment is more costly. If, however, the γ/β ratio is
sufficiently low, unconditional punishers are able to play out
the advantage of higher fines, and accordingly they become the
most successful in resisting the invasions of defectors. Again a
first-order discontinuous phase transition delineates the D + Pc
phase and the D + Pu phase. It is crucial to note that neither
Pc and Pu nor C and Pu (or Pc) are able to coexist. Sponta-
neous coarsening of these three strategies leads to an indirect
territorial battle that is always mediated by defectors, and it is
believed to be generally valid that this type of indirect competi-
tion between different strategies always leads to discontinuous
phase transitions. Such an evolutionary dynamics has been first
described in (Helbing et al., 2010a), while here we argue that
it is indeed much more common than originally assumed, and
that it may be a general mechanism relying on pattern forma-
tion, by means of which spatial structure can be exploited to
create evolutionary advantages for seemingly inferior strategies
(as is the case if comparing cooperators, i.e., second-order free-
riders, and punishers in a well-mixed population). It is in fact
by means of this mechanism that unconditional punishers are
able to crowd out cooperators, and for still higher fines, the un-
conditional punishers are able to crowd out conditional punish-
ers. Under special conditions, for r = 3.8 given at β ≃ 0.42 and
γ ≃ 0.56, the discontinuous and continuous transition lines join,
which we conjecture to be a tricritical point. Above this point
Pu cannot survive, and hence the D + Pc phase goes to the pure
Pc phase via a second-order continuous phase transition. When
the imposed fines are even higher, both D and C die out, and
from that point onwards Pc and Pu become neutral. According
to the voter-type dynamics (Dornic et al., 2001), a logarithmi-
cally slow coarsening determines the final state, which can be
either a homogeneous Pc or a homogeneous Pu phase (hence
the Pc, Pu notation in Fig. 1). The probability to reach either
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Figure 3: Phase diagram, depicting the strategies that remain on the square
lattice in the stationary state at r = 3.5, in dependence on the punishment fine β
and cost γ. Note that at this value of r cooperators are unable to survive alone
in the presence of defectors (Szolnoki et al., 2009). Notation and line styles are
the same as those used in Fig. 2.
depends on the initial ratio of the two strategies at the time D
and C die out. Accordingly, it is more likely that a homogenous
Pc phase will be reached at higher costs, while Pu are likelier to
dominate for values of γ that are below the tricritical point.
A more precise quantitative view of the evolutionary dynam-
ics and the corresponding phase transitions can be obtained by
means of representative cross-sections of the phase diagram,
as presented in Fig. 2. Left panel features the cross-section at
γ = 0.3, where as the punishment fine β increases the discontin-
uous transition from the D +C to the D + Pc phase occurs first,
followed by another discontinuous transition from the D+Pc to
the D+Pu phase, which for even higher fines becomes the pure
Pu phase via a second-order continuous phase transition. The
succession of phase transition at γ = 0.48, still below the tri-
critical point, is slightly different in that the two-strategy D+Pc
phase transform directly into the absorbing Pu phase, without
the intermediate D + Pu phase. The phase transition is discon-
tinuous, and especially near such critical points a sufficiently
large system size is of paramount importance. Here Pu can eas-
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Figure 4: Representative cross-sections of the phase diagram presented in Fig. 3. Depicted are the stationary densities of the four competing strategies (see legend)
in dependence on the punishment fine β, as obtained for three different values of cost: γ = 0.4 (left), γ = 0.56 (middle), and γ = 0.7 (right).
ily become subject of accidental extinction if the system size is
not large enough, and the seemingly stable solution in that case
would appear to be the D + Pc phase, which however would
be a wrong result. In addition, the invasion of Pu is extremely
slow, frequently requiring more than 106 full MCS at L = 1600
system size. If the punishment cost exceeds the tricritical point
the succession of the phase transitions as β increases changes
yet again, as can be inferred from the right panel of Fig. 2. In
that case Pu are unable to invade even at large values of β, and
accordingly the mixed D+Pc phase becomes the pure Pc phase
by means of a continuous phase transition.
If the multiplication factor r is smaller than the threshold en-
abling the coexistence of cooperators and defectors, however,
the phase diagram is topologically similar yet qualitatively dif-
ferent from the one presented in Fig. 1. As can be observed in
Fig. 3, the mixed D + C phase that characterized the low fine
region at r = 3.8 is missing. Instead, at r = 3.5 we have a
pure D phase. Importantly, since cooperators die out, there is
no indirect territorial competition between them and the pun-
ishers, which changes the nature of the phase transition line
that marks the end of the pure D phase. At sufficiently large
fines and moderate punishment costs the pure D phase becomes
the mixed D + Pu phase via a second-order continuous phase
transition. Here unconditional punishers are able to take full
advantage of the higher punishment fine and therefore outper-
form conditional punishers. As the punishment becomes more
costly, however, the more economically acting conditional pun-
ishers become more efficient. The victor between Pc and Pu is
again determined by means of an indirect territorial battle that
is mediated by defectors. In particular, the punishing strategy
that is more effective in resisting the invading defectors will
ultimately share the space on the square lattice with them. Be-
cause of the indirect nature of the evolutionary competition, the
phase transitions between the mixed D + Pu and D + Pc phases
are discontinuous. The tricritical point above which uncondi-
tional punishers cannot survive, and where the discontinuous
phase transition line merges with the continuous phase transi-
tion line, is for this value of the multiplication factor located
at β ≃ 0.53 and γ ≃ 0.63. For high values of the punish-
ment fine the evolutionary dynamics is the same as reported
for r = 3.8, in that the two punishing strategies become neu-
tral as soon as defectors and cooperators die out, and the victor
is thus determined by logarithmically slow coarsening during
which the more widespread strategy is likelier to emerge as the
dominant one.
Representative cross-sections of the phase diagram depicted
in Fig. 3 are presented in Fig. 4. In the left panel, obtained at
γ = 0.4, the continuous phase transition from the pure D to the
two-strategy D + Pc phase occurs first as the fine β increases.
The D + Pc phase then gives way to the D + Pu via a first-order
discontinuous phase transition, which is a consequence of the
indirect territorial battle between Pc and Pu against defectors.
For still higher values of β the D+Pu phase becomes the pure Pu
phase by means of a second-order continuous phase transition.
For γ = 0.56, depicted in the middle panel, the mixed D + Pc
transform directly into the pure Pu phase, and here the same
cautionary notes concerning the required system size and relax-
ation times are in order as issued above for r = 3.8. Above the
tricritical point, at γ = 0.7 depicted in the right panel, uncondi-
tional punishers can no longer survive, and the evolutionary dy-
namics proceeds from the pure D phase over the mixed D+Pc to
the pure Pc phase by means of second-order continuous phase
transitions only. Due to the absence of both cooperators and
unconditional punishers this is indeed expected, as the indirect
territorial competition is no longer possible.
To visualize and understand the leading mechanisms that are
responsible for the reported evolutionary outcomes, it is instruc-
tive to study the evolution of spatial patterns from prepared ini-
tial states, as depicted in Figs. 5(a) and (e). For clarity, we
focus on r = 3.5 and omit the initial presence of cooperators as
they are indecisive for the composition of the final state. The
described evolution of patterns is in fact generally valid and in-
dependent of r as long as β and γ are adjusted to ensure the
same stationary state.
We first focus on the parameter region where unconditional
punishers are unable to survive. The evolution from a prepared
initial state is depicted in the top row of Fig. 5. It can be ob-
served that the domain of unconditional punishers (dark green)
remains completely homogeneous, yet is also shrinks in size
continuously. Ultimately it vanishes, leading to the remain-
der of defectors (red) and conditional punishers (light green) as
the only two competing strategies. Conditional punishers, on
the other hand, proceed rather differently in the fight against
defectors. Their less aggressive style of punishment allows
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Figure 5: Evolution of competing strategies from prepared initial states. Defectors are depicted red, while conditional and unconditional punishers are depicted
light and dark green, respectively. Top row features the evolution of two initially isolated domains of conditional [upper right corner of panel (a)] and unconditional
punishers [bottom left corner of panel (a)] that are placed in the sea of defectors. Although unconditional punishers succeed in keeping a fully homogenous domain,
the later shirks in size continuously [panel (b)], until it eventually vanishes completely [panel (c)]. Conditional punishers, on the other hand, allow “cracks” of
defectors to emerge within their domain [panels (b) and (c)], yet still succeed in spreading and eventually forming a stable coexistence with the defectors [panel
(d)]. Parameter values are r = 3.5, β = 0.58 and γ = 0.9, while the snapshots were taken at 0 (a), 1000 (b), 2000 (c) and 6000 (d) full MCS. Bottom row features
the evolution of a mixed domain consisting of conditional and unconditional punishers that is placed in the sea of defectors. Spontaneous coarsening of the two
punishing strategies starts immediately [panel (b)], and soon they both form isolated domains that are surrounded by defectors [panel (c)]. From there on the
evolutionary competition is determined by a relatively slow indirect territorial battle that is mediated by defectors [panel (d). The punishing strategy that is more
successful against the defectors will ultimately prevail and form a stable coexistence with them. The less successful strategy, which in this particular case are the
unconditional punishers, will die out (not shown). Parameter values are r = 3.5, β = 0.37 and γ = 0.4, while the snapshots were taken at 0 (a), 100 (b), 1000 (c) and
10000 (d) full MCS. For clarity the system size in all panels is L = 200.
small and narrow “cracks” of defectors to appear within the
light green domain. Initially this may seem like a weakness,
yet it turns out to be the winning recipe. Conceptually simi-
lar as reported recently for the public goods game on diluted
lattices (Wang et al., 2012) as well as for risk-driven migra-
tion (Chen et al., 2012), such a configuration results in a sudden
drop of public goods whenever defectors try to spread further.
This in turn makes the defector strategy unlikely to be imitated
further, and in fact the invasion is stopped. Although condi-
tional punishers will in this way never be able to dominate the
population completely, they do succeed in surviving alongside
defectors at significantly lower fines than unconditional pun-
ishers, especially if the cost of sanctioning is comparable to the
imposed fines, i.e., if the punishment is costly.
It is also instructive to examine the evolution from a differ-
ently prepared initial state, in the parameter region where both
types of punishing strategies can in principle survive. The bot-
tom row of Fig. 5 depicts the evolution of a mixed Pc + Pu
domain in the sea of defectors. Practically instantly, after only
100 MCS, the two punishing strategies start coarsening, eventu-
ally forming compact isolated domains that are surrounded by
defectors. This evolution demonstrates nicely that the second-
order exploitation that was raised in several well-mixed solu-
tions is not necessarily viable. Realistically, the interactions we
have with others are always restricted. Everybody is not con-
nected to everybody else, not even on average and neither in
the long run. Given the restricted neighborhoods, some sort
of coarsening will always happen due to imitation, even if the
strategies are neutral. Consequently, smaller communities may
become homogeneous, and they may proceed with their com-
petition against a certain strategy, yet independently of other
strategies that may also be present in the population at the time.
As the panel (g) of Fig. 5 shows, locally this process will not
necessarily result in the victory of the more efficient strategy.
Besides light green islands denoting conditional punishers, dark
green islands denoting unconditional punishers are formed too.
More to the point, the D + Pu phase would actually be stable,
were it not for the presence of Pc, who will eventually crowd
out Pu by means of the indirect territorial battle with the de-
fectors. At this point we again emphasize the apparent general
applicability of indirect territorial competition as a mechanism
by means of which seemingly subordinate strategies may turn
out to be evolutionary stable and prevail over the superior ones.
It is exactly this mechanism that allows punishers, despite their
obvious disadvantage over second-order free-riders, to never-
theless prevail in a structured population without any additional
incentives or strategic complexity (Helbing et al., 2010a), and it
is the same mechanism that allows conditional punishers to pre-
vail over unconditional punishers despite their inherently less
aggressive style of administering the fines to defectors.
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Figure 6: Comparison of efficiency of conditional and unconditional punish-
ment in two three-strategy public goods games, entailing besides the traditional
defectors and cooperators also conditional (filled light green circles) and uncon-
ditional punishers (open dark green circles), respectively. Top panel shows the
cooperation level in dependence on fine at γ = 0.4 and r = 3.5. Bottom panel
depicts the corresponding efficiency of punishment in the two games, defined as
the ratio between the cooperation level and the average cost that is necessary to
maintain it. Conditional punishment is more effective, if only the punishment
is not excessively cheap.
Since the question of effectiveness of conditional versus un-
conditional punishment is far from trivial given that the ratio
between cost and fine is always the same, it is lastly informa-
tive to compare their relations directly in a quantitative man-
ner. To do so properly, we compare the efficiency of two three-
strategy games, namely the public goods game entailing just un-
conditional punishers, as studied previously in (Helbing et al.,
2010b), and the public goods game entailing just conditional
punishers. By focusing on the relevant parameter region where
the two punishing strategies can independently coexist with de-
fectors, we plot in the top panel of Fig. 6 the cooperation level,
i.e., the fraction of Pc and Pu (note that C die out due to small r),
as the function of fine. It can be observed that conditional pun-
ishment lowers the threshold value of fine β at which punishers
can grab a hold in the population. On the other hand, for larger
values of β the fraction of Pu increases fast and quite quickly
exceeds that of Pc. This invites the conclusion that indeed the
unconditional punishment might be more effective, at least in-
directly. Yet this is in general not true. If the punishment is
costly the efficiency of conditional punishment is larger, as can
be demonstrated clearly if we normalize the cooperation level
by the average cost that is necessary to maintain it. The bot-
tom panel of Fig. 6 features the result, which evidences that the
efficiency is almost always higher for conditional punishment,
except when the punishment becomes really cheap. This differ-
ence also explains why D+Pc can prevail over D+Pu for lower
fines.
4. Discussion
We have studied the effectiveness of conditional punishment
in promoting public cooperation, in particular comparing it to
the effectiveness of the more commonly considered uncondi-
tional punishment. We have shown that in the four-strategy
public goods game entailing cooperators and defectors as well
as conditional and unconditional punishers, the later two strate-
gies cannot coexist. Spontaneous coarsening leads to their seg-
regation on the spatial grid, upon which they compete against
each other indirectly through their rivalry with defectors. If
punishment is cheap, i.e., if either the cost of punishing is low
or the fine is comparatively large, unconditional punishers are
more effective in invading defectors, which in turn crowds out
conditional punishers. Conversely, in the more realistic case
when the punishment is costly, conditional punishers are more
successful in deterring defectors, which leads to the extinction
of unconditional punishers. For sufficiently large fines, how-
ever, defectors die out completely, which makes the two pun-
ishing strategies equivalent, and the victor between them is de-
termined by means of logarithmically slow coarsening, as is
known from the voter model (Dornic et al., 2001). Details of
these evolutionary relations, however, depend somewhat also
on the multiplication factor r. If the later is sufficiently large
so that cooperators can survive alongside defectors even in the
absence of punishment, then the mixed D + C phase first gives
way to the mixed D + Pc phase via a first-order discontinuous
phase transition. In this case cooperators and conditional pun-
ishers compete against each other indirectly through defectors.
If the multiplication factor is lower, on the other hand, the pure
D phase becomes either the D+Pu or the D+Pc phase through
a second-order continuous phase transition, depending on the
punishment cost. The ubiquity of indirect territorial competi-
tion in the public goods game with conditional punishment gen-
eralizes the observations of our previous work (Helbing et al.,
2010a), where such evolutionary dynamics was reported first
between D+C and D+P, where P were considered to be uncon-
ditional punishers. Here we show that it may emerge also be-
tween D+C and D+Pc as well as between D+Pu and D+Pc, and
in all cases it leads to discontinuous phase transitions, which
under special conditions may transform into continuous phase
transitions via a tricritical point in the corresponding phase dia-
gram. We argue that indirect territorial competition constitutes
a general mechanism that is driven by pattern formation, by
means of which spatial structure can be exploited to create evo-
lutionary advantages for strategies that are obviously inferior in
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well-mixed populations. Notably, the absence of such complex
evolutionary scenarios in traditional physics systems is due to
the multi-point interactions that emerge because of conditional
punishment, which in turn enriches not only our understand-
ing of the evolution of public cooperation, but also reveals new
ways by means of which pattern formation can manifest itself
in interacting particle systems (Liggett, 1985).
In general, the larger efficiency of conditional punishment
to sustain cooperation in the face of defection lies, quite para-
doxically, in the lesser efficiency of conditional punishers to
grow and maintain completely compact homogeneous clus-
ters. Although this prohibits the total extinction of defectors,
it also enables the spreading of conditional punishers. The ef-
fect is conceptually similar as reported recently for diluted lat-
tices (Wang et al., 2012) and risk-driven migration (Chen et al.,
2012), where it was shown that “cracks” in the otherwise com-
pact cooperative domains lead to a sudden drop of public goods
whenever defectors try to spread further. This in turn makes the
defector strategy less attractive for the neighbors, and indeed
the invasion via imitation is thereby stopped. It is worth noting
on this occasion that the evolutionary advantages of imitation,
even at weak selection pressure, are hardly disputable (Masuda,
2012; Mobilia, 2012; Szolnoki et al., 2012b). In our particular
case the relatively mild application of punishment as adminis-
trated by conditional punishers, along with the relatively lower
cost, turns out to be the more effective cure against the invad-
ing defectors than hard unconditional punishment. Conditional
punishers do allow a relatively small fraction of defectors to sur-
vive inside cobweb-like cracks that are spread across the spa-
tial grid, yet this seeming weakness in fact forms the backbone
of their deceptively simple yet very effective protection against
further invasions. This is also why conditional punishers are
able to maintain cooperation at lower fines than unconditional
punishers, and why the efficiency of the former is in general
higher. Exceptions are parameter regions where punishment is
really cheap, which are evolutionary less interesting and in fact
trivial due to a fully predictable final outcome. Nevertheless,
the message is if the execution of the penalty is cheap, it may
as well be a strong one. Under more realistic circumstances,
where the expenses of punishment need to be taken into ac-
count, however, it always makes more sense to punish condi-
tionally.
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